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OBSERVATIONS ON THE ATTEMPT TO COMMIT BURGLARY
In the recent case of People v. Glickman,
377 IML360 (1941), a defendant was indicted for burglary and found guilty of an
attempt to commit burglary by the trial
court but the Supreme Court reversed the
finding.
In Illinois there are three layers of law
relating to the crime of attempted burglarys (1) the common law; (2) the statutory crime of attempted burglary in the
nighttime (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, chap. 38,
par. 85); and (3) the statutory catch-all
criminal attempt where no express provision is made by law for the punishment of
such attempt (IlL Rev. Stat. 1941, chap. 38,
par. 581). Are these three layers mutuallyexclusive? The question is raised in light
of the fact that the Supreme Court in the
principal case ruled that a defendant indicted for burglary that neither specified daytime or nighttime, could not be
found guilty of an attempt to commit that
crime.
In the instant case the accused was in
the business of selling kink-proof cord in
offices and apartments. The manager of a
hotel on North Dearborn Street in Chicago discovered the defendant on the
eighth floor near the suite of the manager
and thereupon detained the defendant.
The manager claimed his rooms had been
entered and that the defendant told him
he was in the room repairing a faucet but
this the defendant denied. These brief
facts will be sufficient for this note that is
primarily concerned with the law of the
case.
Besides the three layers of law relating
to the criminal attempt to commit burglary there is another very important rule
that might be identified as a fourth layer.

That rule is the one that holds a defendant
indicted for a projected crime can be found
guilty of an attempt to commit that crime
if the evidence does not sustain a finding
of guilty for the projected crime. For example, a defendant indicted for the crime
of rape has been held guilty of an attempt
to commit rape. Reynold v. People, 83 Ill.
479. The decision of the lower court in the
Glickman case would seem to fall within
this rule.
In the face of the ruling of the Supreme
'Court in the principal case the State's Attorney faces difficulty in the burglary cases.
The court referring to the catch-all general attempt provision found in par. 581
of the Criminal Code and mentioned above
as the third layer of attempt law in Illinois, said: "This section applies only
'where no express provision is made by
law for the punishment of such attempt.'
Although the word 'burglary' is not mentioned therein, there is such an express
provision defining and punishing attempted
burglary (the court should have added in
the nighttime), and, therefore, the general
statute relied on by the People does not
apply." The court seems to say since par.
85, or the second layer of law as mentioned
in the beginning of this note, provides for
an attempt to commit burglary in the
nighttime, the lower court improperly
found the defendant guilty of an attempt
to commit burglary upon an indictment
for burglary that did not contain an allegation that the burglary was in the nighttime.
The court says: "The indictment in the
case before us does not contain the essential allegation that the attempt for which
the defendant was found guilty was committed in the nighttime . . . this indict-
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ment and proof will not support that judgment." Why should the court insist upon
the People using and being limited by par.
85, or the second layer of attempt-law as
classified in this note? Why is it unsound
to let the People fall back on (1) the common law layer of criminal attempt, or the
(3) third layer of criminal attempt law as
referred to above, viz., par. 581, the general catch-all criminal attempt provision.
The court when requested to recognize the
rule mentioned above as the fourth layer
of criminal-attempt law, viz., the law that
holds that when an indictment for a higher
crime embraces all the elements of an offense of an inferior degree, the defendant
may be acquitted of the greater crime and
convicted of the lesser if the evidence justifies it, was of the opinion that this case did
not come within that principle. That conclusion seems doubtful. In this case the
defendant was indicted for burglary but
the evidence did not sustain burglary.
Surely it is impossible to deny that the evidence did show an attempt to commit
burglary and therefore the view of the
lower court should have been upheld on
that ground as there are different types of
attempts to commit burglary . . . the
common law recognized various types and
the statutory general attempt likewise recognized various types. But the Supreme
Court only would recognize the "nighttime" type of attempted burglary as being
within the ambit of the principal case.
That is a dangerous construction as it prevents the People from successfully prosecuting the burglar who plys his trade in
the daytime but fails to burglarize yet disturbs the public peace by his criminal conduct.
Because the Legislature of Illinois
enacted a general criminal attempt catchall (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, chap. 38, par. 581)
provision and also enacted a specific type
of attempted burglary in the night time
(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, chap. 38, par. 85) it
does not follow that the specific provision
in par. 85 is exclusive or that it should be
exclusively related to the indictment for

the completed crime where the burglary
projected fails and the conduct amounts
only to an attempt to commit burglary. Is
it not reasonable to conclude that the
Legislature intended the catch-all attempt
provision to be available at all times?
In conclusion it should be noted that it
might be claimed that the decision in the
instant case means only that the People
must use the second layer of attempt law,
viz., par. 85 of the Criminal Code above
mentioned when the burglary attempt was
in the nighttime. When the attempt is in
the daytime the People must use the third
layer of attempt law, viz., par. 581, previously mentioned. If this is the result of
the Glickman decision then it is bound to
be a great boon to defense lawyers because
the philosophical disquisitions on the
meaning of "nighttime" and "daytime"
and "dusk" are most confounding. One recalls in this respect the cases that held it
was not embezzlement because it was larceny and it was not larceny because it
was embezzlement. So here, it would not
be "nighttime" because it was "daytime"
and it would be neither "nighttime" nor
"daytime" because it was "dusk." By recognizing in burglary cases of this type,
(1) the common law, (2) the general attempt provision of the Criminal Code, par.
581, (3) the specific provision relating to
attempted burglary in the nighttime, and
(4) the rule that recognizes a defendant
can be held guilty of an attempt if he fails
to perfect the projected crime, the difficulty
arising if cases similar to the Glickman
would be avoided, as (1), (2), (3), (4),
are not mutually exclusive as each are like
a finger on the hand stemming from a common source and available to attain a common end by either individual or united
action. The People should be able to use
any or all of the rules in order to prevent
a defendant who is guilty of criminal conduct from "beating the rap."
Jom W. CURRAN,
Professor of Law,
De Paul University.
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HOW DOES COMPULSION OF STATUTE AFFECT THE USE OF
VEHICLE ACCIDENT REPORTS AS EVIDENCE?
Tke time honored rule as to self incrimin tion requires that no person in any crim.hal case can be compelled to witness
against himself. The recent decision of the
Canadian Supreme Court in the case of
Rex. v. Walker' constitutes an interpretation of the rule that may be of exceptional
significance in the field of traffic accident
reduction.
On the night of July 16, 1937, a motor
car was proceeding down hill near the village. of Wyebridge, Ontario. The driver
skidded into a ditch. Several persons died
as a result of injuries. When the constable
interrogated Walker, he stated that one
George was the driver. Later, Walker admitted that he was the driver. He was
charged with manslaughter. The prosecution placed the constable on the stand to
testify as to Walker's admission. The judge
refused to permit the testimony on the
ground that Walker was requiredto supply
information under compulsion of statute.
Since the statement was not voluntary, it
violated the common law rule. In consequence, the case was withdrawn from the
jury in the absence of other evidence identifying Walker as the driver.
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower court and held it was
error to refuse the constable's evidence.
Decision of the higher court hinged upon
an interpretation of several sections of the
Ontario Traffic Law which resemble provisions of many state motor vehicle laws

in the United States. Briefed, Section 4J
of the Ontario Act, requires that in the
event of accident, the driver shall remain
at the scene and upon request supply information as to his name, address, etc. It
was by virtue of this that the constable
secured Walker's admissions. Another section (No. 88) requires that the driver involved in an accident submit a report to
proper authorities. But such report cannot
be used as evidence in any case arising out
of said accident.
The issue was therefore raised: did that
part of Section 88 prohibiting use of report as evidence constitute a limitation or
restriction on Section 40? Said the court:
"There is no rule of law that statements
made by an accused under cbmpulsion of
statute are, because of such compulsion
alone, inadmissible against him in criminal
proceedings. Generally speaking, such
statements are admissible unless they fall
within the scope of some specific enactment
or rule excluding- them." Since Section 40
contained no excluding rule, the court held
that information obtained by virtue of it
was admissible. Similar interpretations
relative to state motor vehicle codes would
open the way to the introduction of evidence of exceptional value to enforcement
officials.
DAVID G. MoNmoE,
N. U. Traffic Institute.
70 C.C.C. 240.

